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Introduction
The issue of the return of irregular migrants has be-
come an underlying component of the EU immigra-
tion and asylum policy, which has been progressively 
defined and consolidated after the entry into force of 
the Maastricht, Amsterdam and the Lisbon Treaties1. 
The need to create a common European Union (EU) 
return policy has been, then, repeatedly asserted in 
several European Councils with the aim to empha-
sise readmission and return as key tools in the battle 
against illegal migration. This article purports to con-
duct a brief historical excursus on the evolution of the 
EU’s readmission policy from the outset to the current 
developments through the analysis of readmission 
agreements, meant as its main legal instruments. 
Before scrutinising the premises and implications of 
1 Treaty of Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, entry into force 
on 1 May 1999; Treaty of Lisbon, 13 December 2007, entry into 
force on 1 December 2009.
the consolidation of the EU’s readmission policy, ter-
minological clarifications are needed. The operational 
indicative definition proposed in November 2002 by 
the European Council in its Return Action Programme2 
considers return as “the process of going back to one’s 
country of origin, transit, or another third country, in-
cluding preparation and implementation. It may be 
voluntary or enforced.” Readmission concerns, instead, 
“the act by a state accepting the re-entry of an individ-
ual (own national, third country national, or stateless 
person) who has been found illegally entering to, be-
ing present in, or residing in another state” (Annex I). 
The three actors involved in the repatriation process 
are the State that requests readmission (requesting 
State), the State that is requested to readmit (request-
ed State), and the person to be readmitted (either ir-
regular migrant or rejected asylum seeker, meant as 
an individual who is not in need of international pro-
2 Brussels European Council, 25 November 2002
The author would like to thank prof. Antonino Alì for his comments on the earlier draft of this paper 
and the Faculty of Law of the Lund University for allowing her to conduct 
part of her research on EU readmission policy at its premises.
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Abstract
This article conducts a brief historical excursus on the evolution of the EU’s readmission policy through the analysis of 
readmission agreements, meant as its main legal instruments. The Lisbon Treaty is herein portrayed as an historical 
watershed in the recognition of both an express competence of the Union with regard to measures aimed to address 
the readmission of irregular migrants, and a new role of the Parliament entrusted with the fundamental power to be 
consulted before a readmission agreement is definitively concluded by the Council.
Finally, while a scrutiny of the close relationship between national and supranational readmission strategies reveals 
the unwillingness of Member States to renounce their national readmission policies, a preliminary assessment of the 
potential role of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the field of return of irregular migrants after Lisbon is performed.
8tection).  For the purpose of this study, the term illegal 
is used in relation to a condition and not to a person, 
while the terms irregular (with no regular/legal status 
in the host country) and undocumented (without the 
required papers) migrant are accepted as synonyms 
and extended  to include also persons who illegally 
cross an international border without valid docu-
ments.3
Section I of the article provides a brief historical over-
view on the EU readmission policy, including the in-
stitutional framework, issues of competence, and 
an outline of the main legal instruments; Section II 
canvasses the broad subject of readmission agree-
ments—designed to create a set of procedures and 
obligations between the contracting parties on the 
return of irregular migrants—by revealing how these 
treaties have gained notable importance and visibility 
since the early nineties in shaping the external rela-
tions policy of the EU and in stimulating debate on 
their implications for the human rights of migrants 
subjected to a return decision.4 The primary aim of 
Section III is to shed light on the developments of 
the EU’s readmission policy triggered by the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which strengthens the 
power of the European Parliament in the conclusion 
of such agreements and confer the EU’s explicit com-
petence in the field of readmission. An investigation of 
the tight relationship between national and suprana-
tional readmission strategies is also conducted as the 
EU’s asylum and return policies constitute the general 
framework placed above and beyond the panoply of 
bilateral accords stipulated at an intergovernmental 
level by EU Member States and third countries.
It would go too far comprehensively to analyse the 
complex issue of the impact of readmission agree-
ments on the human rights of returned migrants and 
asylum seekers. Nevertheless, Section IV purports to 
perform a preliminary assessment of the potential 
impact of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), 
which,after Lisbon, ranks as the primary Union Law on 
the readmission practice of the EU.
EU readmission policy before Lisbon: 
institutional framework and competences
Visa, migration, and asylum are relatively new compo-
nents of European policy-making. While, indeed, the 
Treaty of Rome did not contain any provisions on the 
3 On the concept of “irregular migrant”, see Guild 2004: 3.
4 See generally, (Coleman 2009: 111-138; Marchegiani 
2008; Trauner and Kruse 2008)
harmonisation of these matters, the Maastricht Treaty 
attributed such issues to the intergovernmental co-
operation within the third pillar (Justice and Home 
Affairs) of the Treaty on EU (TEU).5 The Treaty of Am-
sterdam, which constitutes a series of amendments 
and additions to the Maastricht Treaty, shifted immi-
gration, asylum, and civil law issues from the third to 
the first pillar and conferred express power to the Eu-
ropean Community (EC)—as set out in Article 63(3)
(b) of the EC Treaty (TEC) (Title IV)—to address the 
issue of “illegal immigration and illegal residence, in-
cluding repatriation of illegal residents.”6 Decisions to 
conclude readmission agreements—the main instru-
ments used by the EU to facilitate the return of people 
who have entered or stayed illegally in the EU—have 
been adopted on the basis of the mentioned article. 
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
in 1999 the European Community (EC) has been em-
powered to enter in its own name into such agree-
ments, thus letting Member States expel people, with 
no title to stay, from the territory of the EU. 
According to the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ), in those cases in which no explicit ex-
ternal competence is mentioned in the Treaty, compe-
tence in external matters, including the power to con-
clude international agreements, can be derived from 
explicit internal competence.7 Furthermore, when EC 
law has created powers for the EC within its internal 
system in order to attain a specific objective, the EC 
has authority to conclude international agreements if 
they are necessary for the attainment of that objec-
tive, even in the absence of any internal measure.8 
Regarding the decision-making process, Article 67 
TEC provided a shared initiative of the Commission 
and the Member States, unanimity in the Council, 
and previous consultation of the European Parlia-
ment. However, with the entry into force of the Hague 
Programme in 2005,9 the decision-making rules have 
been subjected to the initiative of the Commission, 
qualified majority voting of the Council and co-deci-
sion with the European Parliament.10
5 Only two aspects in visa policy in Article 100c were in-
corporated in the Treaty of the European Community (TEC). See, 
(Niemann, 2006: 187)
6 See generally on this issue, (Hailbronner 1998; Monar 1998)
7 This is the so-called principle of parallelism between internal 
and external powers as set out in the ERTA case, 31 March 1971, para 16.
8 Opinion 1/76 [Re Rhine Navigation Case]
9 The Hague Programme, 4-5 November 2004
10 Council Decision 2004/927/EC, 22 December 2004. See 
also, (Peers 2005)
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9In October 1999, the European Council adopted the 
Tampere Programme to implement the provisions of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam in the area of asylum and 
migration.11 Key elements of the Tampere Programme 
were the creation of a Common European Asylum 
System (Section II), the fair treatment of third-coun-
try nationals (Section III), partnership with countries 
of origin of migrants on political, human rights and 
development issues (Section I), and a more efficient 
management of migration flows, including measures 
to tackle illegal immigration as part of a common 
return policy (Section IV). Both the conclusion of re-
admission agreements and a work of assistance to 
countries of origin and transit to promote voluntary 
over forced return also fell within this programmatic 
framework. The same objectives were, then, stressed 
in The Hague Programme (2005-2010) which contains 
a wide range of initiatives to build up a “strong” return 
and readmission strategy. The measures proposed 
by the Hague Programme include, for instance, the 
“Returns Directive”, the creation of a European Return 
Fund by 2007, the conclusion of Community read-
mission agreements, the development of common 
integrated country and region specific return pro-
grammes, and the appointment by the Commission 
of a Special Representative for a common readmission 
policy (para 1.6.4).12 This five-years JHA Programme is 
aimed to define the premises for both efficiently coun-
tering illegal immigration and harmonizing and con-
solidating asylum and migration legislation through 
a comprehensive approach embracing all stages of 
the global phenomenon of human movement across 
borders, with respect to the root causes of migration, 
entry and admission, integration, and return policies 
(para 1.2). Such a global approach to migration can be 
ensured only through a common analysis of migra-
tory trends in all their aspects by means of a strong 
and coordinated effort between those responsible 
for the development of asylum and migration policy 
and those engaged in all other policy fields relevant 
to these areas (para 1.2).
Likewise, the December 2001 Laeken European Coun-
cil emphasised return policy as a crucial instrument 
in the battle against illegal migration and human-traf-
ficking, and viewed the conclusion of EC readmission 
agreements as a suitable strategy to secure the effec-
tive removal of illegal migrants.13 Subsequently, the 
11 Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999
12 See also, (Caritas Report 2007)
13 Laeken European Council, 14-15 December 2001
Commission issued a Green Paper on return policy, 
which focused on forced and assisted repatriation of 
persons residing illegally in the European Union.14
Hardly surprising, a vast range of instruments are part 
of the EU’s return policy, such as the Council Directives 
on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expul-
sion of third country nationals,15 assistance in the 
cases of transit for the purposes of removal by air,16 
Council Decisions on the organization of joint flights 
for removals of third country nationals,17 on financing 
expulsion measures,18 and on the establishment of an 
information and coordination network for Member 
States’ migration management services.19 The return 
policy also encompasses readmission agreements be-
tween the EU and non-EU third countries, which will 
constitute the main object of study of the following 
analysis.
Content and purpose of 
EU readmission agreements
Within the framework of the EU’s return policy, several 
readmission agreements have been signed between 
the Union and third countries as means of facilitating 
the return of persons illegally residing within the bor-
ders of one of the Member States. As a result of the 
April 2002 Green Paper on a Community Return Policy 
on Illegal Residents, readmission was subsumed into 
the common return policy. The main objectives of this 
policy are to fight illegal immigration and expand the 
number of safe third countries around the EU able to 
take the burden of migrants expelled and removed 
from the EU’s Member States. After the Al Quaeda’s 
attacks in September 2001, even more restrictive con-
trol measures have been adopted under Title IV of the 
Treaty on the European Community (TEC) in a climate 
in which migrants and asylum seekers are increasingly 
perceived as a threat to international peace and sta-
bility. If, therefore, EU Member States have attempted 
to elaborate harmonized solutions such as the pro-
gressive creation of the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS),20 they have also employed new logics 
14 Green Paper, 10 April 2002, followed, then, by a detailed Coun-
cil Action Plan and a parallel Action Plan on external border control.
15 Council Directive 2001/40/EC, 28 May 2001
16 Council Directive 2003/110/EC, 25 November 2003
17 Council Decision 2004/573/EC, 29 April 2004
18 Council Decision 2004/191/EC, 23 February 2004
19 Council Decision 2005/267/EC, 16 March 2005
20 The aim of the CEAS is to establish common asylum proce-
dures and equivalent conditions for persons in need of international 
protection valid throughout the EU.
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of reinforcement of EU frontiers control, criminaliza-
tion of migrants (Bigo 2004: 61), and acceleration of 
the procedures for returning foreigners who have an 
irregular status to their countries of origin or transit.21
In general terms, readmission agreements are bilat-
eral or multilateral treaties setting standards and pro-
cedures indicating how return of irregular migrants is 
to be conducted. They generally concern the return 
of own nationals or third country nationals, 22 means 
of establishing nationality, time limits for requests for 
readmission, transit arrangements, exchange of per-
sonal data, costs of transport, national authorities in 
charge of cooperating on the removal of immigrants, 
and a “non affection clause” regulating the relations be-
tween the agreement and other international obliga-
tions arising from international law, including human 
rights. The last Section generally lists final provisions 
clarifying both the territorial scope of the agreement 
and the confirmation that it does not apply to the ter-
ritory of Denmark. Nonetheless, a recommendation is 
made that the third-country and Denmark conclude a 
bilateral accord on readmission in the same terms as 
the EU agreement. 
Denmark as well as the UK and Ireland are embed-
ded in a flexible system of “ins” and “outs” in respect to 
asylum, immigration, civil, policing, and criminal mat-
ters. The Lisbon Treaty brings asylum and immigration 
together with all matters on police cooperation and 
on civil and criminal law into a shared competence, 
entitled “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” (AFSJ), 
which was created with the Amsterdam Treaty and 
constitutes now the Title V of Part III of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) (Articles 67-89). The 
UK and Ireland have opt-outs from the entire AFSJ 
(Protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland in re-
spect of the AFSJ). Thus, they are not bound by any 
legal instrument adopted under the EU’s AFSJ, and 
no judgment of the ECJ interpreting such acts is ap-
plicable to them (Article 2).23 However, in accordance 
21 Between 2005 and 2007, actual removals of unlawful-
ly residing third country nationals within the EU were 756.796. 
Source: Centre for information, discussion and exchange on the 
crossing of frontiers and immigration (CIREFI).
22 In the readmission context, the use of term “third coun-
try national” refers to a person who does not possess the nation-
ality of any of the contracting parties to a readmission agree-
ment.
23 Pursuant to Article 1 of the Protocol on the Application 
of certain aspects of Article 26 TFEU, nothing in EU law affects 
the right of the UK and Ireland to exercise controls over people 
coming from abroad. See (Peers 2009)
with Article 3(1) of the Protocol, the UK and Ire-
land have the possibility to “opt in” and participate 
in the adoption and application of any proposed 
measure, within 3 months of the Commission’s 
publication of a proposal in the AFSJ.24 Unlike the 
UK and Ireland, Denmark is not entitled to either 
“opt in” or participate in the adoption of any meas-
ure under Title V of Part III of the TFEU (Articles 1 
and 2 of the Protocol on the Position of Denmark). 
Therefore, the UK and Ireland have a wider discre-
tion than Denmark in deciding whether and when 
opting in or out a readmission agreement conclud-
ed by the EU. They are not obliged to act together, 
and while so far the UK has participated in all trea-
ties on readmission concluded by the EU with third 
countries—including the most recent one with 
Pakistan—Ireland has only joined the accord with 
Hong Kong. 
While the Maastricht Treaty did not set out any 
opt-outs for the UK and Ireland from EU JHA co-
operation, the Treaty of Amsterdam attached to 
the TEU and the TEC three Protocols establishing 
an opt-out regime for these two countries from 
the following aspects of the EU Justice and Home 
Affairs law: the Schengen acquis, border controls 
measures, and immigration, asylum and civil law 
legislation (Peers 2009: 3-4).
With regard to the pre-Lisbon procedure leading 
to the conclusion of a readmission agreement, only 
the Commission and the Council were involved. 
Following a recommendation from the Commis-
sion, the Council adopted a directive authorising 
the Commission to negotiate a treaty with a third 
country (Article 300 TEC). In performing this func-
tion, the Commission attempted to take a homo-
geneous approach by adopting an informal stand-
ard draft readmission agreement as a model to be 
followed in drafting subsequent accords. The latter, 
along with the Council’s directive, represented the 
content the Community unilaterally relied upon as 
the starting point of negotiations. Since the June 
2002 Seville European Council, the progress in the 
field of readmission and return issues has been 
discontinuous, gathering speed only over the last 
years. At the time of writing (November 2010), the 
Commission has received a total of eighteen nego-
24 For a detailed review on the Lisbon Treaty and the Pro-
tocols affecting the UK, Ireland, and Denmark—which would be 
beyond the scope of this paper—see (Fletcher 2009: 89-95; Chal-
mers, Davies, and Monti 2010: 491-492)
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tiating mandates from the Council,25 but only twelve 
readmission agreements have become operative (Al-
bania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM, Hong Kong, 
Macao, Moldova, Montenegro, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, 
Sri Lanka, and Ukraine). 
Repatriation schemes leading to a bilateral accord 
have been launched with those countries consid-
ered as a priority for the EU on the basis of a double 
standard elaborated by the General Affairs and Ex-
ternal Relations (GAER) Council in November 2004.26 
The decisive selection criteria are the following: “[first], 
migration pressure on particular Member States, as 
well as the EU as a whole; [second], the geographical 
position of countries, including considerations of re-
gional coherence and neighbourhood” (para 3). These 
factors have been employed by the Community in 
selecting States with which negotiating readmission 
agreements and have been considered by the Coun-
cil as “the most important criteria for determining, on 
a case by case basis, with which further countries re-
admission agreements should be concluded.” (para 3)
The common readmission policy is aimed to pursu-
ing different kinds of objectives. First, the fight against 
unauthorised immigration by facilitating the return of 
nationals as well as third country nationals illegally re-
siding in the territory of the EU through the issuance, 
for instance, of travel documents. In this regard, it may 
be added that readmission agreements for the return 
of third country nationals are usually based on transit 
through the territory of the requested States. Second, 
the establishment of a “buffer zone” of third countries 
responsible both to readmit immigrants from the EU 
and to intercept migrants en route to the EU (Cole-
man 2009: 61). Third, the promotion of readmission 
agreements between third countries themselves (in-
25 In September 2000, the Council adopted a first set of 
directives for the negotiation of readmission agreements with 
Morocco, Pakistan, Russia and Sri Lanka; in May 2001 and in June 
2002 new directives were adopted for negotiating respectively 
with Hong Kong and Macao, and with Ukraine. In November 
2002 the Council added directives for Albania, Algeria, China, 
and Turkey, followed by mandates for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia. In the JHA Coun-
cil meeting of 4 and 5 June 2009, the Council adopted two de-
cisions authorising the Commission to open negotiations with 
the Republic of Cape Verde for the conclusion of agreements on 
facilitation of issuance of short-stay visas and on readmission. 
Finally, on 28 November 2008, the Council gave the European 
Commission the mandate to start the negotiations of the read-
mission agreement with Georgia. Signed in November 2010, it 
will enter into force on 1 March  2011 (See, Table 1)
26 Draft Council Conclusions, 2 November 2004
cluding transit and source countries), thereby broad-
ening the number of States able to receive migrants. 
Further, the EU encourages third countries’ readmis-
sion negotiations through the so-called AENAS Regu-
lation, which enables the Union to fund projects and 
supply technical and financial support.27
     The draft Constitutional Treaty signed in Rome on 
29 October 2004 provided the EU with an explicit 
legal basis for concluding “agreements […] for the 
readmission of third country nationals residing with-
out authorisation, to their countries of origin or prov-
enance” (Article III-267(3)).28 Nevertheless, it did not 
rapidly enter into force because of its rejection by ref-
erenda in France and the Netherlands. It means that 
until December 2009, marking the date of adoption 
of the Lisbon Treaty, the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam 
has offered the legal reference frame for the conclu-
sion of readmission agreements at the EU level. In-
deed, with the Treaty of Amsterdam the Community 
acquired competence to sign such agreements with 
third countries while issues regarding visa, immigra-
tion, asylum, and other policies related to the free 
movement of persons were transferred from the third 
to the first pillar (Title IV). Pursuant to Article 63(3)(b) 
TEC, “the Council […] shall […] adopt […] measures 
on immigration policy within the area of illegal immi-
gration and illegal residence, including repatriation of 
illegal residents”. Given the lack of reference to “read-
mission” in both the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (TEC) and the Treaty on the EU (TEU), the 
competence to conclude readmission agreements 
could be derived from a broad interpretation of the 
term “repatriation”, which is meant to include also the 
readmission of migrants to transit countries (Billet 
2010: 60).
The issue of the division of competences in the camp 
of readmission is not without controversy. On the one 
hand, the Commission has traditionally claimed the 
exclusive power of the Community to negotiate and 
conclude these international bilateral treaties. This 
view is in line with the stance of the Legal Service of 
the Council, which pinpoints how the existence of 
inter-state policies of readmission would risk to create 
potential distortions in an area without internal border 
controls and with free movement of persons where 
readmission policies of other EU Member States can 
be circumvented by secondary movements of illegal 
27 AENEAS Regulation,18 March 2004
28 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed at 
Rome on 29 October 2004. See generally, (Monar 2005: 9)
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migrants to another EU country.29 Moreover, an often 
quoted argument is that the conclusion of an EU re-
admission agreement can have an added value rep-
resented by the political and normative weight of the 
Union in encouraging third countries to accept and 
fulfil readmission obligations.30 Nonetheless, the JHA 
meeting of 27 and 28 May 1999 reconfirmed the issue 
of allotment of competences as an enduring punc-
tum dolens in the path of cooperation between the 
EU and its Member Sates since the latter reasserted 
their unwillingness to renounce national readmission 
schemes:31 competence remained, therefore, shared 
as moulded in more specific terms in the Lisbon Treaty.
The Lisbon Treaty and the relationship between 
interstate and EU readmission agreements 
The EU’s readmission policy constitutes the gen-
eral framework placed above and beyond the broad 
cobweb of formal and informal bilateral readmission 
agreements stipulated by EU Member States with 
third countries. A close relationship between national 
and supranational return policies is undisputable and 
is also corroborated by the fact that Member States 
continue to pursue their readmission procedures in 
parallel with the EU’s strategy. In this vein, also para-
graph 7 of the Preamble of the “Returns Directive” un-
derlines “the need for Community and bilateral read-
mission agreements with third countries to facilitate 
the return process.”
Readmission has, therefore, turned out to be an un-
derlying component of EU immigration and asylum 
policy, which has been progressively defined and con-
solidated after the entry into force of both the Am-
sterdam and the Lisbon Treaties. Also the “Stockholm 
Programme – an open and secure Europe serving and 
protecting the citizens”, adopted in December 2009, 
portrays readmission agreements as a building block 
in EU migration management.
In the context of a common immigration policy, “the 
European Parliament and the Council, acting in ac-
cordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall 
adopt measures in the area of illegal immigration and 
unauthorised residence, including removal and re-
patriation of persons residing without authorisation” 
(Article 79(2)(c)). The Lisbon Treaty has also modified 
29 Council Doc 665/99, 10 March  1999; see, (Migration 
News Sheet 1999: 1)
30 Proposal for a Comprehensive Plan to combat illegal im-
migration, 14 June 2002, para 76. See also, COM(2001) 672 final, 25
31 Council Presidency Conclusion, 27-28 May 1999
the legal basis for the conclusion of international 
agreements in the field of readmission. Article 79(3), 
indeed, expressly gives authority to the EU to stipulate 
agreements with third States for the readmission of 
third-country nationals who do not or who no longer 
fulfil the conditions for entry, presence, or residence in 
one of the Member States. If the substance of this Ar-
ticle is not new, having the EC already brokered trea-
ties on this subject with eleven countries worldwide 
(Migration Watch UK 2008), the Lisbon Treaty repre-
sents, however, a turning-point in the recognition of 
an explicit competence of the Union with regard to 
measures designed to addressing the readmission of 
irregular migrants. A cross-reading of Articles 207 and 
218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) 
spells out the procedures to be followed for adopt-
ing an agreement with a third country: as a first step, 
the Council gives a mandate to the Commission to 
negotiate the treaty. Next, after negotiations are con-
ducted by the Commission on the basis of the guide-
lines received from the Council—which appoints a 
special committee for assisting the Commission in this 
task—a compromise is reached and the Council, on 
a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision 
authorising the signing of the agreement. Finally, the 
Commission will sign the agreement in the name of 
the EU as the Lisbon Treaty has eventually endowed 
the Union with legal personality (Article 47 TEU). It is 
also worth observing that EU readmission agreements 
do not require separate ratification by Member States’ 
governments or parliaments.
While, in pursuance of Article 300(3) TEC, the Euro-
pean Parliament was only consulted and its role was 
limited to delivering a non-binding opinion after both 
parties had already signed the agreement, the Lis-
bon Treaty provides that the Council, on a proposal 
by the negotiator, shall adopt the decision conclud-
ing the accord only after obtaining the consent of 
the European Parliament (Article 218(6)(a) TFEU). This 
new empowerment undoubtedly is one of the most 
important innovations of the Treaty and the fact that 
under Article 218(10), “the European Parliament shall 
be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the 
procedure” implies the capacity of this body, when 
dealing with readmission agreements, to gather infor-
mation and data during the negotiation process with 
regard to the structure and content of the accords as 
well as their implications for the rights of migrants and 
asylum seekers.  
The issue of division of competences has sparked a 
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heated debate over the years, and Member States 
have openly contested an alleged exclusive compe-
tence of the EU. However, what counts is that the Lis-
bon Treaty does not bestow upon the Union the ex-
clusive power to negotiate readmission agreements 
since Article 4(2)(j) of the TFEU incorporates “Freedom, 
Security and Justice”—which clearly encompasses 
also readmission—in the field of shared competence. 
The relationship between the EU and Member States, 
however, continues to be grounded on the principle 
of “sincere cooperation” enshrined in Article 4(3) of the 
TEU, which reads a follow: 
pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Un-
ion and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, 
assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from 
the Treaties.
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, 
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obliga-
tions arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts 
of the institutions of the Union.
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the 
Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could 
jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.
Therefore, as supported also by customary practice, 
competence would remain shared with Member 
States, which are, thus, able to continue to conclude 
such arrangements on a bilateral basis. Although the 
European Commission is responsible for the negotia-
tion of readmission agreements, the overall phase of 
implementation, including the decision to return an 
irregular migrant, the issuance of a request of read-
mission and the enforcement of a removal order rests 
entirely with the Member States.32
Previous State-negotiated bilateral agreements are 
still in force and used, but, by virtue of the ‘safeguard 
clause’, EU readmission agreements take precedence 
over State-negotiated ones in case of incompatibili-
ties. When, then, a third country is concurrently bound 
by obligations deriving from readmission agreements 
concluded with both the EU and single Member 
States at a bilateral level, the conflict could be solved 
by referring to the third contracting State. Indeed, the 
third country by accepting the ‘safeguard clause’ can 
be deemed as implicitly renouncing to apply provi-
sions in conflict with the agreement signed with the 
32 Letter dated 23 March 2009 from the European Com-
mission, DG Justice, Freedom and Security to the President of 
Migreurope
EU. Saying that, the treaty concluded at a bilateral 
level continues, however, to be in force (Marchegiani 
2008: 332).
It is often mistakenly assumed that the role of Mem-
ber States is totally dismissed once the Commission 
and the Council independently decide to negotiate 
and conclude an EU readmission agreement, thereby 
overlooking the fact that the mandate of the Commis-
sion only consists in “brokering the agreement” (Cas-
sarino 2010: 18). Indeed, as Karel Kovanda lucidly put 
it in 2006 
EC readmission policies and agreements fall under the 
external dimension. They set out reciprocal obligations 
binding the Community on the one hand and the part-
ner country on the other hand. But once an agreement is 
negotiated, the Community responsibility is over. Its day-
to day implementation, the actual decision about send-
ing a person back and the actual operation it involves—
all this is entirely within the competence of our Member 
States.33
     The JHA Council of May 1999 sustained that a Mem-
ber State must always notify the Council of its inten-
tion to negotiate a bilateral readmission arrangement, 
and can carry on with the process only if the Com-
munity has not already stipulated a treaty with the 
concerned third State or “has not concluded a man-
date for negotiating such an agreement.” Exceptions 
are represented by the case in which Member States 
require more detailed arrangements to compensate 
a Community agreement or a negotiating mandate 
containing only general statements. However, “Mem-
ber States may no longer conclude agreements if 
these might be detrimental to existing Community 
agreements” (JHA Council 1999). To put it differently, 
they “shall exercise their competence to the extent 
that the Union has not exercised its competence. 
The Member States shall again exercise their com-
petence to the extent that the Union has decided 
to cease exercising its competence” (Article 2(2) of 
the TFEU). Should a State contravene this obliga-
tion, an infringement procedure could be brought 
by the Commission to the ECJ under Article 258 of 
the TFEU. To date, no Member State has stipulated 
a readmission agreement with a third country with 
which the EU has already concluded a treaty. Nev-
ertheless, Spain signed readmission arrangements 
with Morocco and Algeria even if the Commission 
33 See, http://www.eurasylum.org/Portal/April2006.htm
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had already concluded a mandate for negotiating 
agreements with these countries.34 If such a prac-
tice may be considered at variance with the principle 
of cooperation in good faith,35 it is also true that the 
Commission, up to now, has never referred the matter 
to the ECJ under the Treaty infringement procedure.
Member States have also a duty to notify the Com-
mission, the Council, and the Parliament their negotia-
tions as well as the current status of implementation 
of their arrangements (either formal or informal). At 
the same time, EU readmission agreements contain 
monitoring mechanisms that could be strengthened 
to guarantee a constant updating on the implemen-
tation process in each Member State. As a general rule, 
the agreements concluded at the EU level sets up a 
Joint Readmission Committee (JRC) comprising repre-
sentatives of the European Commission as well as ex-
perts from the Member States and representatives of 
the partner third countries that should be involved in 
the analysis of the implementation and interpretation 
of the accords. Overseeing how readmission agree-
ments are translated at the domestic level also entails 
the duty to gauge whether governments effectively 
comply with their international and European human 
rights obligations with regard to people returned to 
countries of origin or transit on the basis of readmis-
sion agreements. These EU instruments only provide 
for the inclusion of a so-called “non affection clause”, 
which generically refers to the commitment of gov-
ernments to make the treaty consistent with interna-
tional obligations arising from international law. Ad-
vocates of readmission agreements do not question 
whether these arrangements are consistent with hu-
man rights since they do not provide a legal basis for 
rejection. In their view, human rights considerations 
should arise only when taking the return decision, not 
when enforcing such a decision with the help of a re-
admission agreement (Coleman 2009). Nevertheless, 
concerns have been expressed by NGOs, Internation-
al Organisations, and scholarship with regard to the 
existence of a causality link between the application 
of these accords and the likelihood of human rights 
violations for returned irregular migrants and asylum 
seekers (Council of Europe 2010: 2). Such an approach 
34 While the mandates for the EC agreements with Alge-
ria and Morocco were given in 2002 and 2000, respectively, the 
agreement between Spain and Algeria entered into force on 18 
February 2004 whereas that one with Morocco was signed on 6 
March 2007.
35 See, e.g, Commission v. Luxembourg Case, 2 June 2005, 
para 60.
is consonant with the idea that readmission agree-
ments are part of the whole process of return of ir-
regular migrants that, in each single phase, must be 
consistent with human rights. A thorough investiga-
tion of the compatibility of readmission agreements 
with refugee and human rights law would be beyond 
the frontiers of this article since the argument of the 
dearth of human rights safeguards in the text of the 
accords is open to counter arguments that cannot be 
deeply revisited and articulated within the boundaries 
of this contribution. Nonetheless, in the next section, 
an attempt is made to expound the potential role of 
the CFR in the field of readmission as, with the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it has become part of 
the core EU legislation.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights:
 a preliminary assessment after Lisbon
The Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) is a “regional 
supranational instrument” reinforcing the protection 
of migrants and asylum seekers in international and 
European law (Gil Bazo 2008: 33). It sets out a whole 
range of civil, juridical, economic, and social rights and 
has become legally binding with the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. Since the 
meaning of the rights enshrined in this Convention 
depends on how the ECJ interprets them in particu-
lar cases, it is difficult to assess a priori the impact this 
instrument could have on returned asylum seekers 
and irregular migrants. Nevertheless, it is important to 
realise that the incorporation of the CFR in the Treaty 
of Lisbon expands the power of the ECJ to interpret 
whether both the EU institutions and Member States 
follow human rights standards in making and imple-
menting EU law, respectively (Migration Watch UK 
2008).36 Indeed, while the Charter is certainly applied 
to EU institutions, it is also relevant for Member States 
implementing EU law. Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty 
also extends the ECJ’s jurisdiction over asylum and im-
36 It also worth observing that the Protocol on the Ap-
plication of the CFR to Poland and to the United Kingdom states 
in Article 1 that ‘[t]he Charter does not extend the ability of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, or any court or tribunal 
of Poland or of the United Kingdom, to find that the laws, regu-
lations or administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland 
or of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamen-
tal rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms.
In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Title IV 
of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland or 
the United Kingdom, except in so far as Poland or the United 
Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law’. See, 
(Barnard 2008)
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migration policy,37 provides for the gradual introduc-
tion of an integrated management system for external 
borders (Article 77(1)(c) TFEU), and empowers the EU 
to develop common policies for asylum and immigra-
tion (Article 78(2) TFEU). With regard to the legal ef-
fect of the Charter, it ranks now as primary Union Law 
and compliance with it has become a requirement for 
the validity and legality of the EU’s secondary legisla-
tion in the field of migration and asylum. Moreover, 
as established in Article 51 of the Charter, its scope of 
application is limited to the areas in which Member 
States are implementing Union Law and it “does not 
establish any new power or task for the Community 
or the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by 
the Treaties.”38 Yet, although the TEU, as amended by 
the Lisbon Treaty, sets out that the Charter will have 
“the same legal value as the treaties”, it does not con-
stitute, properly speaking, a treaty as a matter of in-
ternational law since it is not an agreement between 
States. Indeed, in accordance with the Article 1(a) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “a treaty 
is an international agreement concluded between 
States in written form and governed by international 
law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in 
two or more related instruments and whatever its par-
ticular designation.” On the contrary, the CFR has been 
neither signed nor ratified by the Member States, and 
its provisions have not been included in the Lisbon 
Treaty.39  The Charter will have, therefore, the same le-
gal value as the treaties as a matter of Union law but 
its relation with other international human rights in-
struments is not governed by the Vienna Convention 
(Gil Bazo 2008: 35).
Pursuant to Article 52(4) of the Charter, 
insofar as this Charter contains rights, which correspond 
to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [ECHR], 
the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same 
as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision 
37 ECJ’s jurisdiction in immigration, asylum and civil law 
applies equally to all Member States, including the UK and 
Ireland, but only in so far as they have opted into the legislation. 
See, (Peers 2009: 12)
38 Art 6(1) TEU as amended by the Lisbon Treaty also 
states that the Charter “does not extend in any way the compe-
tences of the Union as defined in the Treaties”
39 The CFR was signed and proclaimed by the Presidents 
of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
on behalf of their institutions at the European Council meeting 
in Nice on 7 December 2000.
shall not prevent Union law from providing more exten-
sive protection. 
According to the “Explanations” relating to the CFR,
 the reference to the ECHR covers both the Convention 
and the Protocols to it. The meaning and the scope of 
the guaranteed rights are determined not only by the 
text of those instruments, but also by the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights and by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. The last sentence of the 
paragraph is designed to allow the Union to guarantee 
more extensive protection. In any event, the level of pro-
tection afforded by the Charter may never be lower than 
that guaranteed by the ECHR.
It emerges, therefore, that Charter provisions should 
be interpreted and applied in accordance with the 
ECHR principles as determined by the jurisprudence 
of the Courts of Strasbourg and Luxembourg. 
Other international human rights tools can be con-
sidered as sources of inspiration for Charter provi-
sions. According to Article 53, 
nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting 
or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as recognized, in their respective fields of ap-
plication, by Union law and international law and by 
international agreements to which the Union or all the 
Member States are party, including the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, and by the Member States’ constitu-
tions.
The reading of the Article 53 indicates how the Char-
ter tends to expand rather than restrict human rights 
protection in the Union by recognising also the rel-
evance of international agreements to which Mem-
ber States are party for interpreting and enhancing 
human rights principles as enshrined in the Charter 
itself.
From this brief analysis of the CFR, conclusions may 
be drawn which are of relevance for showing how 
human rights obligations fall upon the EU and its 
Member States when both drafting and enforcing re-
admission agreements with non-EU third countries, 
which are not necessarily bound by the same interna-
tional and European human rights instruments and 
do not always offer legal safeguards comparable to 
those granted by States within the EU milieu.
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Concluding Observations
This paper conducted a brief historical excursus on 
the evolution of the EU readmission policy through 
the analysis of readmission agreements, meant as its 
main legal instruments. Over the last years, there has 
been a change in the perception of the relations of the 
EU Member States with third countries, which have 
become, indeed, the beneficiaries of compensatory 
measures offered by the EU to enhance their coopera-
tion in fighting illegal immigration. If on the one hand, 
this cooperative framework shows that provisions 
adopted by Brussels can no longer be shaped only by 
domestic security concerns, on the other, the EU’s re-
turn policy and EU readmission agreements continue 
to be viewed by most third countries’ governments as 
responding predominantly to the interests and secu-
ritarian policies of the EU Member States.  
Retracing the main stages of the readmission policy, 
the Maastricht Treaty attributed immigration, asylum, 
and civil law issues to the intergovernmental coop-
eration pillar while the Amsterdam Treaty shifted such 
matters from the third to the first pillar and conferred 
express power to the EC to address the issue of “illegal 
immigration and illegal residence, including repatria-
tion of illegal residents” (63(3)(b) TEC). However, given 
the lack of reference to “readmission” in both the TEC 
and TEU, the competence to conclude readmission 
agreements could only be derived from a broad inter-
pretation of the term “repatriation”. Conversely, the Lis-
bon Treaty modifies the legal basis for the conclusion 
of international agreements germane to readmission 
and expressly grants authority to the EU to conclude 
agreements with third States for the readmission of 
third-country nationals who do not or who no longer 
fulfil the conditions for entry, presence, or residence in 
the territory of one of the Member States (Article 79(3) 
TFEU). In this vein, the Lisbon Treaty represents an his-
torical turning point in the recognition of both a spe-
cific competence of the EU with regard to measures 
addressing the readmission of irregular migrants, and 
the new role of the Parliament entrusted with the un-
derlying power to be consulted before a readmission 
agreement is definitively concluded by the Council.
Although an EU-negotiated treaty can have an add-
ed value represented by the political and normative 
weight of the Union in encouraging third countries 
to accept and fulfil readmission obligations,40 Mem-
40 Proposal for a Comprehensive Plan to combat illegal 
immigration and trafficking of human being in the EU, 14 June 
2002, para 76.
ber States have often expressed their unwillingness 
to renounce their national readmission policies: com-
petence, therefore, has always remained shared, both 
before and after Lisbon. 
Finally, a brief examination of the potential role of the 
CFR in the field of readmission has been carried out 
showing how the incorporation of this instrument in 
the Treaty of Lisbon expands the power of the ECJ to 
interpret whether both the EU institutions and Mem-
ber States follow human rights standards in making 
and implementing EU law, respectively.  As also rec-
ommended by the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, the EU should ensure that read-
mission agreements and return policies are consist-
ent with relevant human rights standards, including 
the CFR, which, with the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, has become part of the core EU legislation. Tak-
ing readmission agreements as a key component of 
the “return toolbox”, further studies should, however, 
be designed to investigate what impact they have on 
the policies of the Member States of the EU as well 
as on the rights of migrants and refugees returned by 
means of these accords to either their countries of ori-
gin or transit.
As already stated, the predominant doctrine deems 
standard readmission agreements are executive in-
struments, which serve to enforce a national decision 
of expulsion or removal and do not provide a legal 
basis for rejection. It is, indeed, in the initial phase 
of formulation of an expulsion decision that human 
rights-related considerations should be made by 
governments. Nonetheless, human rights concerns 
should be taken into account in all the phases of the 
return process, from the issuance of the expulsion de-
cision to the enforcement of such an order. No claim is 
made here to explore in depth the complex relation-
ship between readmission agreements and human 
rights, still an open issue in the doctrine. 
However, as a matter of pubic international law, it is 
particularly important to interpret the value of refer-
ences to human rights and democracy in the pream-
ble of any readmission agreement in order to gauge 
whether they are either mere assumptions on which 
the accord is predicated or real objectives of the treaty. 
A recurrent objection moved to the possible incorpo-
ration of stringent human rights clauses in the text of 
readmission agreements is grounded on the fact that 
EU Member States are already bound by human rights 
principles deriving from international customary and 
treaty law as well as from European law. Therefore, 
16
Interdisciplinary Political Studies
Vol.1, No. 0, February 2011
©IdPS
ISSN 2039-8573 OnLine
adding in the text of such accords (those concluded by 
either single Member States or the EU) further legal safe-
guards concerning refugees and asylum seekers would 
amount to a superfluous reiteration. These issues remain 
moving targets for analysis, as the political debate within 
the EU is still in a formative phase, and as such they can-
not be explored in full here. Nonetheless, it is of utmost 
importance to clarify that EU Member States and non-EU 
third countries are not necessarily bound by the same 
international and European human rights instruments, 
in particular with regard to the acquis communitaire (in 
primis the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights). As practice shows, 
third countries do not always offer the same legal safe-
guards granted by EU Member States, and the jurisdic-
tional reach of supranational judges will be limited in case 
of violations of fundamental rights committed by read-
mitting countries. Thus, if inclusion of precise safeguards 
for refugees could be a replication for EU Member States, 
it might constitute, instead, a fundamental benchmark 
for third countries. Further, legally binding human rights 
clauses would create more onerous obligations than 
those deriving from general international law. In this case, 
the inclusion in the text of bilateral treaties linked to re-
admission of specific obligations referring to the protec-
tion of human rights and refugee rights would be doubly 
beneficial: if on the one hand, it would increase legal cer-
tainty for both governments involved, it would also be in 
line with Article 60(1) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties which provides that ‘a material breach of a 
bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to 
invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty 
or suspending its operation in whole or in part.
In conclusion, it may be observed how both the EU and 
Member States have developed different readmission strat-
egies with third countries of origin or transit of migrants, 
often within the framework of restrictive and securitarian 
policies, which confirm how the debate on agreements 
linked to readmission and their implications for the rights 
of asylum seekers is, essentially, a political debate involving 
national security and identity concerns. Therefore, the real 
danger, in the era of the “war on terror”, is that States start 
to unduly emphasise uncertain and flexible national secu-
rity interests to the detriment of the protection of migrants’ 
fundamental rights. The opportunity to conduct inten-
sive research upon such an issue can be lucidly explained 
through the words of Louis Henkin: ‘how [a State] behaves 
even in its own territory, [is] no longer […] its own business: 
it has become a matter of international concern, of inter-
national politics, and of international law’ (Henkin 1999: 4).
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1. List of EU readmission agreements41
Third country Mandate Date of signature Entry into force
Albania November 2002 14 April 2005 1 May 2006
Algeria November 2002   
Bosnia and Herzegovina November 2006 18 September 2007 1 January 2008
Cape Verde June 2009   
China November 2002   
Georgia September 2008 22 November 2010 1 March 2011 
FYROM November 2006 18 September 2007 1 January 2008
Hong Kong April 2001 27 November 2002 1 March 2004
Macao April 2001 13 October 2003 1 June 2004
Moldova December 2006 10 October 2007 1 January 2008
Montenegro November 2006 18 September 2007 1 January 2008
Morocco September 2000   
Pakistan September 2000 26 October 2009 1 December 2010 
Russia September 2000 25 May 2006 1 June 2007
Serbia November 2006 18 September 2007 1 January 2008
Sri Lanka September 2000 4 June 2004 1 May 2005
Turkey November 2002   
Ukraine June 2002 18 June 2007 1 January 2008
 41 This table, updated to January 2010, is drawn from the following website: http://www.mirem.eu/datasets/agreements/
index/european-union More recent updates are mine.
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